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DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN HIGHLAND 
ETHIOPIA 1900-1987* 
By James C. McCann 
The ability of the rural population in highland Ethiopia to sustain large 
state systems, underwrite a political tradition of expansion, and maintain its labor 
efficiency through the use of the plow has recently run afoul of persistent 
famine. Contemporary observers have blamed the vagaries of climate, regional 
conflict, and government agrarian policy for the crisis in food production. 
Recent evidence, however, has pointed out that the poor performance of the 
Ethiopia's agricultural sector did not begin in 1974 but was evident in the 1950s.1 
This paper extends that thesis by pushing the dates even further back and 
examining the historical evidence of causes of that decline visible iri the 
historical record of the twentieth century. 
In the end, I wish to raise the question of whether historical indicators 
support the case for a twentieth-century agrarian cycle. Can we discern from 
available evidence a process of growth followed by a pattern of agricultural 
decline which has contributed to rather than resulted from the contemporary 
crisis in political economy? 
Highland Ethiopia's agricultural circumstances are not unique in the 
contemporary world or in history. Its rural sector resembles, then as now, the 
basic model of a "preindustrial society characterized by slow technical change 
where processes of growth are still dominated by the play between demographic 
expansion and limited resources," a description as applicable to highland Ethiopia 
in the 1970s or 1920s as to sixteenth-century southern France.2 
An agrarian cycle represents growth and decline within equations of 
productivity, returns to labor, and production per unit of land. For highland 
Ethiopia in the early to mid-twentieth century the relative roles of population 
and productivity in regional and local economies have resembled what 
Emmanuel Leroi Ladurie has called the "Malthusian scissors," which opened as 
population expanded into an abundant resource of land and capital, but which 
have begun to close in many regions as per capita productivity stagnates. Both 
* I wish to thank Desalegn Rahmato, Allan Hoben, Tekalign Wolde Mariam, Michael Glantz, and 
participants in the workshop "Agrarian Transformation in Northeast Africa" at Boston University for 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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For arguments and data on the decline of agricultural productivity in the 1950s see Warren Robinson 
and Famika Yamazaki, "Agriculture, Population, and Economic Planning," Journal of Developing Areas, 20 
(1986), 385; for the 1960s see Dessalegn Rahmato, "The Peasants and the Comrades: Problems and Prospects of 
Socialist Transition in Rural Ethiopia," paper presented to the African Studies Association, Denver, 
Colorado, November 1987. 
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Emmanuel Leroi Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc (Urbana, 1976), 296. 
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phases are visible in Ethiopia's twentieth-century record; in the past two decades, 
however, the latter stages have been dominant. The result has been a cycle of 
progressive squeezing of productive capacity of the agrarian economy in a north-
to-south and east-to-west pattern. Though a modern political economy has 
emerged at Ethiopia's center, the traditional peasant economy of the northern 
and central highlands has not significantly altered the fundamental limits on its 
productive capacity. On the contrary, key factors governing productivity of both 
land and labor have gone into decline at the same time that peasant 
"entitlements" to the benefits of growth elsewhere in the Ethiopian economy--
most notably in the south and west--have failed to materialize. 3 
The decline of agricultural productivity over the last few generations has 
not been a uniform process; it has proceeded in fits and starts, with serious 
decline in some areas and rapid, if short-lived, advance in others. This paper 
traces over time particular features of the agrarian economy which have had 
direct effects on agricultural productivity, including demography, climate, 
technology, cropping systems, property systems, and the political domain 
(warfare, agrarian administration, and fiscal policy). I have drawn on historical 
and technical documentation as well as fieldwork within several areas of the 
northern and central highlands historically dependant on smallholder farms. 4 
.Demography: New Equations of People and Land 
The historical distribution, density, and growth/decline patterns of the 
rural population have had a major effect on agricultural production in highland 
Ethiopia. Demography, in fact, provides the foundation of the argument for a 
twentieth-century agrarian cycle. Indeed, the rates of growth/decline in 
popnlation historically accounts for a great deal of the regional and temporal 
variation in forms of agriculture, uses of labor, and land tenure arrangements. In 
a number of areas a relatively low density of population to land and resources 
allowed economic expansion while in other areas population pressure supressed 
both gross product and per capita production. 
The historical evidence of demographic variation across the highlands 
and across time is primarily qualitative in nature. Available indicators of 
demography are strong correlations between population density and forms of 
agricultural activity such as forms of labor, land distribution methods, and 
household landholding estimates. These features reveal themselves in oral 
evidence, in extant survey statistics, and in published observations by travelers 
and officials. Moreover, we do not have a comprehensive data set or historical 
studies for all regions. Nonetheless, the evidence available suggests strongly· that 
while population has not been distributed evenly, there has been a broader 
logarithmic progression of population growth through the present century. 
3 
Amartya Sen argues that the concept of entitlements accounts for the uneven distribution of famine 
within a regional and national economy. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famine: An Essay in 
Entitlements and Deprivation (Oxford, 1981). 
4 
My analysis here is restricted largely to the areas of highland cereal production, those areas hardest 
hit by famine. My field experience and research includes Wallo, Goodar, Gojjam, northeastern Shawa, and 
the Wubera and Babile regions of Hararge. 
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At the opening of the twentieth century the population of many regions 
of the northern highlands appears to have begun a period of recovery after the 
major famine/epidemic of 1889-1892. The recovery probably proceeded slowly, 
stumbling during regional droughts or epidemics, and certainly slowing or halting 
during the 1917-1919 influenza pandemic. Italian censuses from Eritrea suggest 
strongly that growth of highland populations continued even through faltering 
aggregate food production and localized agricultural crises.5 
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Source: Istituto Agricola Coloniale, L'Economia Eritrea, 43-44, cited in 
Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea (Uppsala, 1987), 
149. 
The average annual rate of growth for Eritrea was therefore 2.9 percent, 
close to the natural rate in the 1980s.6 
From other evidence the pattern of general growth across the highlands 
through the 1920s and into the post-war years emerges from the available sources 
with population growth, migration, and declining productivity being closely 
linked. The best hard evidence of this process is comparative aerial 
photographic data for the period 1955-1975 from the Simen region. In the 
surveyed area highland population rose by an annual rate of 2.4 percent in the 
most populous and productive elevations (barely below the natural 2.5 percent 
increase), but rose 3.58 percent in the lower elevations. Since 1964 the upper limit 
of cultivation in the Simen region has climbed 100 meters to just below the frost 
line limit.7 This evidence from a · region which historically and ecologically 
resembles areas of Western Tigray, western Wallo, and parts of Gojjam suggests 
5 
The decline of food production from 1921 through 1931. See Tomaso Silliani, L' Africa Orient ale 
Italiana (Eritrea e Somalia) (Rome, 1933). On the relative gain of highland population versus pastoralists, 
see Tekeste Negash, Italian Coloni.alism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact (Uppsala, 
1987), 150. 
6 This rate is my calculation based on the Italian censuses. The 2.5 percent rate is cited from Ethiopia's 
Central Statistical Office. 
7 
B. Messerli and K. Aerni, eds., Simen Mountains, Ethiopia. Volume 1: Cartography and Its 
Application for Geographical and Ecological Problems (Bern, 1978), 34. Also note that movement up is 
clear in the highland Debre Berhan area where frost and waterlogging are primary constraints on keremt 
cultivation rather than drought. Gryseels and Anderson, Research, 9. 
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strongly that localized migration and the expansion of cultivation is a product of 
population growth. This pattern verifies statistically the much wider trend of 
immigration to less productive and more risky lowland cultivation evident earlier 
along the eastern escarpment. Below the Addis Ababa to Asmara road (the 
former caravan route) areas like Qobbo in Wallo or Denki in northern Shawa, 
lowland zones which had been primarily pastoral wet season grazing have been 
cultivated in the past one or two generations by migrant highlanders. 
The story of the lowland regions east of the old Shawan capital of 
Ankober, reveals a local pattern of regional population dynamics which has 
emerged in the past two generations. The lowland zone of Denki between 1500 
and 1200 meters is now inhabited by mixed Amhara Christian and Muslim 
Argobba farmer/weavers who have been hit hard by drought since 1972. The 
Ankober region as a whole has received a steady influx of Amhara settlers since 
the mid-nineteenth century. 8 There general patterns of ambilineal descent and 
partible inheritance have changed in response to the threat of fragmentation. 
Prior to 1974, elder siblings were able to "buy off" the claims of younger family 
members in order to retain viability of holdings. Life histories of present 
inhabitants reveal a consistent movement into these lowland areas by highland 
Christian farmers· who were the younger, dispossessed children of households 
located in highlands to the west. New migrants arrived first as tenants using 
magazo (sharecropping) agreements with local Muslim landholders and have 
continued to arrive since the 1975 land reform to claim the diminishing stock of 
open land. Household holdings in these lowland areas average 2-2.5 hectares, 
substantially above current adjacent highland area averages of 1-1.5 hectares. 
Peasant associations in those highland areas have reached critical 
land/population ratios and social property institutions have adjusted by barring 
land claims by new residents. 
The Denki experience has wider application since the district resembles 
an ecological belt below the eastern escarpment which has low agricultural 
potential--drought-prone, limited dry season pasture, and homoeopathic disease 
problems-rather than soil infertility. The effect on agricultural productivity in 
this lowland zone has been less the result of land shortage than problems of 
climate variability inherent in lowland zones where drought, particularly in the 
important belg season, plays such a critical role for marginal farms. Beyond the 
loss of crops, the greatest effect of drought has been to deplete the supply of 
oxen, which have died more from the lack of forage than the lack of water. 
Overall, the increase of population in such areas through in-migration and a 
natural population growth has substantially increased the proportion of the 
highland population susceptible to climate variation. 
In another case, the highland Tegulet district of northern Shawa to the 
west of the escarpment closely resembles the progression of population growth 
evident in the Simen study. In that district population pressure has built steadily 
since at least the post-war period, but probably for much longer. In Tegulet the 
specter of drought has not been a regular part of the rural experience. Under the 
pressure of population growth, however, pasture has virtually disappeared and 
land holdings are uniformly less than two hectares. Even the river flood plains 
8 
Svein Ege, "Chiefs and Peasants: The Socio-political Structure of the Kingdom of Shawa about 1840" 
(M.A. thesis, University of Bergen, 1978), 60-63. 
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1000 meters below the plateau have been cultivated. The overall effects of such 
pressure on per capita productivity are evident. Farmers plow with cows because 
of the shortage of livestock and pasture; landlords before 1974 hoarded small 
hay-producing plots as a source of income and leverage over their fodder-poor 
tenants. The age of first marriage has increased dramatically since there is no 
land to allocate to new households. Pressures to migrate to lower areas are 
evident but lowland regions down into precipitous river gorges have already been 
occupied. Indeed the greatest effects of recent agricultural droughts have been 
felt there rather than in the long-occupied highlands, though both areas suffer 
from the reduction of fallowing and crop rotation (see below).9 
The population crisis building over the course of this century is not 
restricted to the Amhara/Tigrayan highlands. In the Wubera region of Hararge 
household land holdings average less than 1/2 hectare and pasturage has all but 
disappeared. There the rural economy depends on the sale of chat, the narcotic 
cash crop, to offset the subsistence food deficit; the average household can only 
produce about 600 kg of grain in the best years, a nine- to ten-month supply. Yet, 
per capita chat income has declined dramatically as existing trees are divided as 
property among male descendants. Other signs of population pressure are 
clearly marked. The oldest inhabitants recall · a heavily ·forested land and 
substantial pasture which within living memory supported an agro-pastoral 
economy based on subsistence crops--maize and sorghum--and a diet of milk and 
gunfo (a cereal/milk paste). Cash income from chat (and coffee in other areas of 
Hararge) and the consequent relatively heavy involvement in a regional cash 
market economy has buffered the effects of the demographic explosion, though 
the basic constriction of resources available to household production units in 
traction, forage, and productive land has created a dependence on international 
food donations in the past three years. 
The historical relationship between population growth, migration, and 
economic decline appears graphically in the gradual movement of Tigray's rural 
population from north to south and out of agriculture since at least the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Drought and political instability probably accelerated 
this process, though I believe it was fundamentally based in the limits of ecology 
and small farm economics. By the early 1880s Tigrinya-speaking migrants from 
Hamasen had already arrived in the Wag region of Wallo and settled there as 
farmers. 10 From at least that period, Tigrinya speakers had penetrated into 
northern Wallo as farmers, but even more prominently as part of a mercantile 
migration which penetrated south along the caravan route to Shawa. As small 
market towns emerged between Koram and Dese to manage the regional trade in 
hides, salt, and grain, Tigrinya-speaking small merchants and entrepreneurs 
played a prominent part. Many of these had moved to full:time commerce after 
a beginning in petty agricultural trade. The presence of northerners as part of 
the conquest and occupation of the south reflects Ethiopia's modern political 
9 
ILCA baseline surveys of Ada and Debre Berhan areas report the trend toward reduction of fallow 
and pasturage. For a discussion of the needs for intensification see James McCann, Unpublished Report to 
Oxfam U.K. on Evaluation of Hararge Projects, 1987, and James McCann, Unpublished Report on Evaluation 
of Ox/Seed Project, Oxfam America, 1986. 
lO See Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Inde/Jendence (London, 1976), 378, and McCann, 
Poverty to Famine, 187. 
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economy but also the strong "push" out of the northern rural economy. 11 Thus 
the farming population from some of the more densely settled portions of the 
highlands had already begun a movement physically away from their agricultural 
bases and incorporated trade as a primary economic base. 
It is far more difficult to find data to determine exactly the origins of 
agricultural stagnation or to discern periods of recovery amid general decline 
than to identify the overall phenomenon. Nevertheless, by 1926 Talamonti, the 
Italian resident at Maqale, argued to his superiors in Asmara that Tigray and the 
north were in a "virtual famine condition," despite the lack of major ecological 
catastrophes in that period. 12 Such evidence as exists suggests strongly that the 
decline of the agricultural economy progressed in a basic north-south direction, 
affecting eastern zones more fully than the west. Eritrea's consistent demand for 
grain from Sudan and northwest Bagemder is another good indicator of the 
decline of that area's agricultural base. Italian development schemes which 
required wage labor had to look outside to colony for surplus grain to feed them 
since Eritrean food production declined steadily through the 1920s.13 Eritrea and 
Tigray experienced the decline earlier than Wallo, and Gojjam has yet to feel the 
full effects. 14 
The slow -transformation of local economies provides additional evidence. 
The presence of an active market in grain, salt, and imported manufactured 
goods has played a far more substantial part in the rural household economies of 
Tigray and Eritrea than for points further south where pressure on the 
agricultural economy was felt much later. The income from local-level trade, 
especially in the eastern regions of Tigray and Eritrea sustained those economies 
past the viability of agriculture. By the late 1960s Dan Bauer found that 
households regularly engaged in petty trade as a strategy for supplementing 
income. 15 Indeed, the most significant difference between the economies of the 
Wag (adjacent to Tigray) and Lasta districts of northern Wallo was the greater 
dependence of the former on off-farm trade income and the northbound grain 
market. 16 
11 
For greater detail on push factors see James McCann, "Households, Peasants, and the Push Factor in 
Northern Ethiopian History," Review (1986). 
12 
Talamonti to Addis Ababa, Archive Storico delle Ministero Africana Italiana 37/6 and 54/36, 8 
August 1926. 
13 
The annual trade statistics and politics of the dura trade appear in annual reports from the Central 
Economics Board located in the Sudan Library, University of Khartoum. Eritrean food production figures 
are available in Sillani, L'Africa Orientate Italiana. 
14 
Volker Stitz, "Distribution and Foundation of Churches in Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian 
Studies, 13, 1: 17. From this work it is clear that there is a strong correlation-at least in traditional Christian 
areas-between length of settlement and population densities. The areas of highest church and population 
density are in Tigray, northern Shawa, and northern Wallo. Gojjam was settled by Christian highlanders 
only in the sixteenth century. See Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia (Oxford, 1972), 
15 
See, for example, Dan F. Bauer, "Land, Leadership, and Legitimacy among the Inderta Tigre of 
Ethiopia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1972), 15. 
16 
This characterization was made in both historical and contemporary terms in interviews of residents 
of northern Wallo. See McCann, Poverty to Famine, 188. Saqota, for example, was a far more active 
market center for middle-distance trade than was Lalibela. 
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Population growth in and of itself would not necessarily have a negative 
effect on productivity, except that the prevailing relations of property, 
technology, and historical response to such pressure have led to migration and 
expansion to new land rather than a general intensification of labor with the 
application of technology and cropping systems. The sections below analyze the 
apparent absence of those processes of adaptation. 
Climate: The Rhythm of the Seasons 
The historical role of Ethiopia's climate has been an enigma, largely 
because of the lack of hard historical data and the failure of climatologists and 
social scientists to cooperate in understanding the relationship between climate 
and human action. Most of the historical studies of climate have therefore 
focused on the record of famine and/or drought as recorded in royal chronicles, 
church documents, or the accounts of foreign travellers.17 Nevertheless, such 
records are spotty and impressionistic, and tend to feed the myth of a famine 
cycle in Ethiopia. The point here is that climate as a feature of ecology, as 
William Cronon has noted, is not a constant but historical and dialectic. 18 
The basic features of. Ethiopia's climate are well known. The agricultural 
cycle of labor, social reproduction, and resource allocation on the northern 
highlands reflects primarily the regime of rainfall. 19 In most northern highland 
areas rainfall is bimodally distributed, creating three seasons: keremt (a summer 
rainy season late June to September), belg (small rains from March to early May), 
and bega (the dry harvest season October through February). Except in areas 
above 2800 meters where summer frosts are a problem, the main growing season 
falls in the summer with a crop planted in late June or July and harvested in 
December and January. Belg rains also allow for a smaller, but often significant 
crop harvested just prior to summer planting. 
The rainfall calendar for the northern highlands thus follows a clear 
pattern, within which variation is a significant feature. In January and February, 
harvest months, rainfall is minimal; sun-baked, heavy soil and limited forage 
mean there is little post-harvest plowing. In March and April the mean level of 
rainfall increases, but with a significant degree of year-to-year variation in the 
total amount and consistency over these two months. In May and June the 
amount continues to increase with great variation in reliability by region. By 
late June and early July (in some regions on Saint Mikael's day) the main rains 
17 For treatments of history and drought see Bahru Zewde, "A Historical Outline of Famine in 
Ethiopia," in Abdul Mejid Hussein, ed., Rehab: Drought and Famine in Ethiopia (London, 1976), and 
Ethiopian Delegation, "Climate and Drought Conditions in Ethiopia," and Workineh Degefu, "Some Aspects 
of Meteorological Drought in Ethiopia," in Glantz, Drought and Hunger. A more substantial study of the 
social effects of drought, in this case the 1889-92 famine, is Richard Pankhurst, "The Great Ethiopian Famine 
of 1888-92: A New Assessment"' Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 21 (1966), 95-124, 
271-294. 
18 William Cronon, Changes in the Land; Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England 
(New York, 1983), 13-14. 
19 Workineh Degefu, "Some Aspects of Meteorological Drought in Ethiopia," in Michael Glantz, ed., 
Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future (Cambridge, 1987), 27, indicates that for 
highland agriculture rainfall and moisture availability is the key "limiting factor." 
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begin and continue through September. Variability steadily decreases into July 
and August. The dates of seasonal transition--i.e. the onset and end of the two 
rainy seasons--constitute the most agriculturally significant variable. 
The patterns conform to more general observations that variability is 
strongly correlated with rainfall amount and elevation. 20 Thus lowland areas 
below 2000 meters experience the most significant variability. The reliability of 
belg rains in particular varies considerably across the highlands. For the 
Combolcha area in the important Wallo region the rains are relatively reliable in 
April (beginning of the belg rains) but highly unreliable for the crucial months 
of May and June, which are key growing months for belg crops; in comparison 
the main rains are fairly reliable. By contrast, in Ada, the productive agricultural 
zone south of Addis Ababa, the major month of variability is May, the key 
month of June being significantly more reliable, with important implications for 
start-up activities for the major crop cycle. Debra Marqos in the drought-
resistant Gojjam region shows a consistent decline in variability throughout belg 
leading directly into the main rains. The Gondar area, 100 kilometers north of 
the prosperous Lake Tana region shows similar tendencies. In all cases 
variability increases dramatically in October and through the January/February 
period when rainfall - amounts decrease though variation there is not 
agriculturally significant. 21 
The effects of seasonality on the annual rhythm and resource manage-
ment--distribution of labor, capital needs, and livestock management-on peasant 
farms are significant. Since the patterns of variability revealed here have 
contributed to quite different characteristics of the seasons, especially the critical 
dimension of inter-annual variation, I would argue that it is to this pattern of 
climate--rainfall being the key "limiting factor" to agriculture in the highlands--
that the agricultural system and its social corollaries have responded over time.22 
In fact, climate's interaction with human activity is the key issue, not 
climate in isolation. 23 While meteorological droughts have been a fact of climate 
history across Ethiopia in the twentieth century they are not the norm, nor are 
they always agriculturally significant. Far more critical have been the patterns 
of interannual variation in the beginning and end of the seasons, uncertainties 
ZO Ethiopian Delegation, "Climatic and Drought Conditions in Ethiopia," Paper Prepared for the 
Scientific Roundtable on the Climatic Situation in Africa, Addis Ababa, February 1984, 4. The climatic 
phenomenon of the coincidence of high variability and low rainfall levels is also mentioned by R.P.D. Walsh, 
"The Nature of Climatic Seasonality," in Robert Chambers, Richard Longhurst, and Arnold Pacey, eds., 
Seasonal Dimensions to Rural Poverty (London, 1981), 16, 21, who notes also that patterns of seasonality 
change over time has generally meant greater variation in the beginning and end of rainy seasons. 
21 
Calculations of interannual variation of rainfall and seasonal variation in four highland areas are 
available in James C. McCann, "Climate and Class in Ethiopia: The Seasons and the Historical Development 
of Agricultural Stratification," Paper presented to the African Studies Association, Denver, November 1987. 
The key statistical measure of variability is the coefficient of variability, the standard deviation divided by 
the mean. 
22 
The index of "seasonality" developed by Chambers et. al is the sum of the absolute deviations of 
mean [my emphasis] monthly rainfall from the overall mean divided by the mean annual rainfall. See Walsh, 
"Climatic Seasonality," 13-15. 
23 
Michael Glantz makes a clear distinction between agricultural drought and meteorological drought. 
See Glantz, "Drought and Economic Development in Africa," in Glantz, ed., Drought and Hunger, 41-48. 
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for which farmers have had to plan. Moreover, the effects of climate variation 
from month to month and year to year have had a far more serious impact as per 
capita resources such as land and livestock have declined relative to population. 
Thus climate plays a part in an agricultural cycle primarily in its interaction with 
human activities not as an independent variable. 
The effects of interannual variation on agricultural change in the 
highlands can be seen in the impact of the spring rains. Spring rains in many 
areas have come to play a critical role in the economic cycle. Though they 
account, on average, for only 5-15 percent of the total annual crop, they provide a 
critical margin of productivity on smaller, resource poor farms which lack both 
capital and credit in providing food for the hungry season before the main 
December/January harvest. Beyond the harvest they provide, spring rains allow 
for more effective and timely seedbed preparation, and regeneration of livestock 
resources by improving pasture. Resource poor farmers faced a classic dilemma 
of whether to plant belg crops or to allow those fields to regenerate as pasture to 
sustain livestock into the main plowing season. 24 
When belg rains fail poor farmers must borrow new seed, obtain food, 
and pay higher costs for obtaining oxen in preparation for the main rains. 
Climate statistics show quite clearly that belg rains fail more often than the main 
rains in all highland zones. In the Debre Berhan area, for example, only one in 
three belg seaons has sufficient rains for a crop, yet declining supplies of land 
have forced cultivation on frost-prone areas where only belg crops are possible. 25 
As overall resources of land and capital decline with population growth (see 
below), the lack of reliable spring rains has had an increasing impact on 
agricultural production, helping to produce a new class of poor, indebted farms. 
In many highland areas reliance on belg rains for food and capital maintenance 
are a distinctive feature of the twentieth century, or, more fundamentally, the 
mature stage of an agrarian cycle. 
This phenomenon is not so much the product of drought per se but of 
climate interaction with social and economic change on the agrarian scene. 
Agricultural droughts when they have come are not necessarily the cause of 
economic decline but they exacerbate the weakness of farm economies. Recent 
work on famine victums suggests that the class of capital poor farmers lacking 
stored food, credit, and key productive resources have been hardest hit by 
droughts when they have come. In fact, climate's effects vary depending on the 
maturity of the agrarian cycle itself, i.e. the density of settlement, use of marginal 
lands, and distribution of capital resources. 
Technology: The Tools and Techniques of Production 
The basis for highland agricultural technology is the equipment, cultigens, 
and agronomic techniques of the highland's distinctive dryland farming system. 
The single-tine scratch plow, a pair of oxen, an array of leather, wooden and iron 
24 Dessalegn Rahmato has told me that some farmers in Wallo have begun to avoid belg planting in 
favor of supporting their livestock. For most others in my experience belg crops were far more critical to 
food and seed supplies. 
25 Gryseels and F. Anderson, Research on Farm and Livestock Productivity in the Ethiopian 
Highlands: Initial Results 1977-80 (Addis Ababa, 1983), 9-10. For data on belg variability see note above. 
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processing tools, and a metal plow tip have served as the capital equipment of 
the rural farming household. This basic form has been stable in most areas for 
over a millennium; in southern areas such as Hararge, it has been in place for 
almost a century. The work of Joseph Michels and Frederick Simoons suggests 
strongly that the plow has been part of the northern highland farming system 
since pre-Axumite days.26 The plow came later to areas in the south and west 
incorporated under the aegis of Menilek's state, yet the adoption probably had 
less to do with Amhara stewardship of the rural economy than it did the longer-
term spontaneous process of sedentarization of Cushitic pastoralists. 27 In most 
areas the plow has been supplemented by an array of locally inspired tools--hoes, 
spades, or digging sticks--used by work groups, oxenless farmers, or by women for 
homestead gardens. 28 
Remarkably, there has been very little innovation in design, materials, or 
application evident in this farm equipment, nor in technologies of application 
(irrigation, mechanization, incorporation of new forms such as viticulture). 
Donald Crummey's survey of nineteenth-century crops and technologies suggests 
considerable stability in crop varieties. 29 Imported steel plowshares replaced 
local wooden or iron tips in the early twentieth century, but this was more a 
change in durability than concept. Surprisingly, the shift to mouldboard steel 
plows, harrows, or seeding apparati which took place in Europe at critical points 
of productivity take-off has not taken place in Ethiopia even in v.ery recent 
years. Even where agronomic techniques have adapted to local conditions, such 
as the use of broadbeds to avoid waterlogging or terracing to increase usable 
land, farmers have not adopted new tools for the task. Despite occasional 
observations of the use of horses, donkeys, camels, or cows, oxen have remained 
entrenched as the traction animal of choice. Indeed, the economics of 
smallholder farms and risk aversion strategies have produced fairly consistent 
resistance to such change and even abandonment of such techniques as terracing 
and irrigation employed in the past, or in other locations. 30 
26 
This evidence on the persistence of highland dryland plow agriculture comes from recent 
interpretations of Axum data. See Joseph Michels, The Axumite Kingdom: A Settlement Archaeology 
Perspective," paper presented to the Ninth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Moscow, August 
1986. An earlier treatment of the presence of the plow in highland agriculture is Frederick Simoens, "Some 
Questions on the Economic Prehistory of Ethiopia," in J.D. Page and Roland Oliver, eds., Papers in African 
Prehistory (Cambridge, 1970), 124-129. 
27 
This information derives from interviews held on 4 July 1987 with Bakar Daud (age c. 100) and 
Yusef Chela (age 75) at Lelissa Peasant Association, Wubera, Hararge. Muhammad Hassan argues that 
agriculture in the Wubera region diffused from the vicinity of Harar town. See Muhammad Hassan, "The 
Relationship between Harar and Its Surrounding Oromo between 1800-1887" (B.A. thesis, Haile Sellassie I 
University, 1973). 
28 
These hand tools vary by area: the doma in Amharic is a short hand hoe similar to the akafa for 
Oromo; in Hararge fallow land is broken with the dongora, a stone-weighted digging stick. 
29 
Crummey, "Ethiopian Plow Agriculture in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 
16 (1983), 1-24. 
3o Recent International Livestock Centre for Africa variations on the ox plow technology, such as 
seeding attachments, single-ox plows, or broadbed makers, have shown promise but not much spontaneous 
adoption to date. See Guido Gryseels and Samuel Jutzi, Regenerating Farming Systems after Drought: 
ILCA's Ox/Seed Project, 1985 Results (Addis Ababa, 1986). 
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The mechanization of smallholder agriculture, even in the most developed 
agricultural zones, has been marginal. The reasons for this lack of capital 
intensification are fairly obvious. First, the basic labor surplus which 
characterizes the highland rural economy means that the opportunity cost of 
labor during key periods when farm operations need mechanization ( during 
spring plowing and harvest/threshing) is close to zero.31 Oxen are indeed a 
scarce resource, but those farmers without animal traction are also those least 
able to employ mechanization. Second, credit within the traditional rural 
economy is scarce and prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of farmers, 
even for small-scale additions of equipment. The usurous annual rate of 120 
percent has been traditional across the highlands through most of this century. 32 
Though some wealthy elite may have been able to afford investing in new forms 
of technology, the historical dominance of tenancy rather than the development 
of plantations or other forms of direct elite involvement in agriculture 
discouraged innovation on the part of both farmer and elite.33 
The reasons for technological conservatism are open to debate. The 
historian Merid Wolde Aregay has placed the burden of technological stagnation 
firmly on the social system inherent in peasant land tenure and the insecurity of 
income rights of elite in the agrarian political economy. Merid Wolde Aregay 
has argued strongly that the rist system of land tenure and partible property 
rights together with elite control of income rights (gult) combined to stultify 
technological initiative: 
The gult system made sure that emporers, noblemen, warlords, soldiers as 
well as monks knew the names and domiciles of their gab bars [farmer/taxpayers]. 
There was no need for them to kown the land and inquire into the technology of 
agriculture. The peasant on the other hand, was completely aware of the factors 
which affected agricultural activities. He knew the quality of his soil and what 
soils were more receptive to what grains. He undertsood at which levels of the 
highland each type and strain of his grains thrived best. Travellers, from F. 
Alvarez down to H. Salt, saw how carefully he could irrigate his lands as well as 
tend and grow fruit trees of all kinds .... The low level of live of the Ethiopian 
peasantry and of the ruling classes cannot, therefore, be attributed to primitive 
31 There is often a demand for labor at harvest. See Gene Ellis, "Man or Machine, Beast or Burden: A 
Case Study of the Economics of Agricultural Mechanization in Ada District, Ethiopia" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Tennessee, 1972), 41 For a dissenting view on mechanization see Dessalegn Rahmato, "Moral 
Crusaders and Incipient Capitalism," Proceedings of the Third Annual Seminar of the Department of 
History (Addis Ababa, 1986), 71-72. 
32 
See V. Grottanelli, "Richerche geografiche ed economiche sulle populazione," Missione de Studio 
al Lago Tana, II (Rome, 1939), 147-48; also see James C. McCann, "Households, Peasants, and Rural History 
in Lasta, Northern Ethiopia 1900-35" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1984), 93 and note 55; Dan 
Bauer, "Land, Leadership, and Legitimacy among the lnderta Tigray of Ethiopia" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Rochester, 1972), 131. 
33 Gene Ellis's work on Ada (40 kilometers south of Addis Ababa) in the early 1970s has pointed out 
the uneconomic nature of mechanized agriculture even in the most developed, market-oriented highland 
farming systems. Land fragmentation, the low opportunity cost of labor, and problems of maintenance 
rendered tractors highly uneconomic. More important, the yields from mechanized plots was not significantly 
higher than those using ox-plow methods. Ellis argues that tractors have appeared only as a result of the 
economics of government subsidies for credit and fertilizer to ·landlords. See Ellis "Man or Machine," but 
also Dessalegn, "Moral Crusaders." 
' 
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technology. The rest form of tenure and the endless segmentation of farms that 
it entialed deprived the peasant of the will to work and to seek improvement. It 
made him quarrelsome while at the same time shutting and fixing him within the 
confines of his ancestral village .... 34 
This perspective effectively points out the relationship between 
technological innovation and social processes but also idealizes the active, 
knowledgeable farmer outside of the factors which, in fact, make him/her a 
peasant. As Merid suggests, examples of new forms of technology abound, but 
systematic application has been profoundly isolated. Indeed the fragmentation of 
political authority which characterizes highland political culture has inhibited 
the cooperation necessary to sustain irrigation, especially in the face of demands 
on upstream resources resulting from population growth. 35_ In fact, some of the 
most visible forms of innovation have come in the adaptation of labor and land 
distribution in areas of low population density rather than technological change 
under population pressure, quite the opposite of a tradition of agricultural 
intensification. Crises in climate and food resources, far from stimulating 
innovation, appear to have driven smallholders further into conservative risk 
aversion strategies. 
The slow pace of technological change in agricultural technology in 
Ethiopia is not merely the result of poverty, state neglect, or an innate sense of 
conservatism among farmers. The social and economic complexity of local 
farming systems, the weak market orientation, lack of credit, and economies of 
scale have restricted technological change. The complexity of explaining why 
technological innovation has not taken place notwithstanding, the impasse of 
technology amid crises of diminished resources in land and capital described 
below has placed a severe limit on the agricultural economy's ability to raise 
productivity. The traditional equations of land/labor/demographics have 
operated within specific technological boundaries. The failure to alter those 
limits over time has defined productivity within local and regional agrarian 
cycles of growth and decline. 
34 
See Merid Wolde Aregay, "Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity, 1500-1850," Proceedings of 
the Third Annual Seminar of the Department of History, 115-130, 
35 
I have observed this phenomenon in the Ankober lowlands where locally innovated irrigation has 
virtually ceased because of new upstream water demands. I am grateful to my colleague Dessalegn Rahmato 
for pointing this general effect out from his own work in Wallo. 
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Social and Property Relations 
The relationship between population, agricultural productivity, and the 
adaptation of social institutions has been a major factor of consistency in the 
period. Among the most salient historical evidence on social adaptation of the 
farming/social system of the highlands is the expansion of the system and its 
cropping/technology spackage itself. The cultivation of cereals using the 
highland plow has been expanding from its northern core for several centuries. 
With it has traveled a distinctive set of property rights which includes ambilineal 
descent and partible property, and an expansionist political culture. The military 
ability of the imperial state and local equivalents to expand its own tributary 
hegemony underwrote the natural flow of population to the frontiers of culture 
and cultivation. 
The expansion of the soldier/farmer to new lands was a prerequisite for 
establishing imperial control. The first expansion took place to areas of ideal 
climate and elevation on the southern perimeter of Amhara/Tigrayan settlement, 
a frontier which has advanced considerably to the south and west since Axum. 
The settlement of. soldier/farmers and establishment of .churches. to serve them 
created a context for the expansion of the farming system. The steady move of 
imperial capitals south since Axumite times was at least partially an indication of 
a series of progressive shifts to areas of less intensive cultivation and higher 
productivity. 
The agrarian production regime has been as important an element for the 
assimilation of Cushitic populations on the periphery as has the military power 
of the state. Agaw speakers of Gojjam, Lasta and Simen have adapted wholesale 
the highland farming system while retaining their language. In Hararge, by 
contrast, the Oberra Oromo of Wubera managed to accept plow agriculture in 
the late-nineteenth century with their own mix of crops and without 
relinquishing Islam or their own property/inheritance/marriage systems. 36 
More recently in the post-war period the expansion of the highland 
farming system has taken place into low potential zones where conditions for 
highland crops and livestock use patterns have had to adapt. In the east, the 
movement to cultivate lowland areas below the escarpment has been a general 
trend from Eritrea south to northern Shawa. The evidence for this shift includes 
observations of spontaneous migration to new cultivation in Wallo, near Qobbo 
and Koram and in Sirinka, in Shawa, below Ankober, and in Tigray. In the west 
there has been considerable seasonal and permanent movement to Setit-
Humera.37 These areas have traditionally served as wet season pasture for 
36 
See note 13 above. Informants from Wubera claim that the plow predated the Amhara presence in 
the late nineteenth century but that short season crops arrived with the Amhara in 1887. 
37 
For Qobbo see Assefa Bekele, Yitateku Negge, and Tewolde Gebre Egziabher, "Zobel: An 
Experiment in Relief and Rehabilitation," unpublished mimeograph, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 
1974; for Sirinka see Noel Coussins, "The Day of the Poor Man," unpublished mimeograph, Drought Relief 
and Rehabilitation Commission, 1975. 
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lowland pastoralists and have been sites of conflict. 38 The much higher risk of 
drought and variability of rains, especially spring rains, has imposed a slightly 
different set of crops and social adaptations. 
The imperative to expand is explained as much by the needs of the 
farming system as it is by the military tradition. The historical ability to do so 
has fairly consistently obviated the need to intensify labor or adopt new 
technology. Ironically, as land resources have diminished relative to population 
in areas of long-time settlement, it has been capital resources as much or more 
than land which have become scarce factors. Consequently, social institutions 
for the distribution of labor and capital have become increasingly important over 
time. In both Lasta of the 1920s and northern Shawa in the 1980s local 
institutions for the borrowing and transfer of oxen and seed have been key to 
establishing patterns of debt and dependency locally. Capital resources are, after 
all, those which are first to disappear during climatic or economic crises. The 
social institutions which link wealthy farmers to poor ones through accumulated 
debt have endured in form and function right through the twentieth century, 
though their effect is most graphic in areas of increasing population density and 
vulnerability to climate variation. 
The evidence of social adaptation· to new ratios of population to resources 
from the northern highlands is scattered but reasonably convincing. Allan and 
Susan Hoben who worked in Manz district of northern Shawa in the mid-1960s 
were able to observe the latter stages of the repopulation of an area thinned 
during the Italian occupation. The population which had abandoned the land 
between 1936 and 1941 had slowly returned to improved ratios of livestock to 
population and relative prosperity, approximating the historical advantages of 
movement to new zones.39 Dan Bauer's evidence from eastern Tigray has shown 
how population pressure transformed land distribution from open-ended 
residence-based claims to a more restrictive rist-based system as density 
increased. 40 The labor shortage relative to land which encouraged the use of 
slave villages and sharecropping villages in Walqayt also involved flexibility in 
social/economic response. 
The effect of the agrarian reforms since 1974 has been to increase the 
effects of demographic pressure rather than reducing them. This pattern of 
increasing exclusion with in-migration and natural population increase is event 
more recently in the rules of peasant associations in northern Shawa. The land 
reform in these areas brought a higher demand for land allocations with the shift 
from a descent-based allocation system to a residence-based one. Evidence on 
land redivision is not available nationally, but plot size and overall landholding 
area in four areas I have worked appear to have decreased precipitously in the 
38 
The outbreak of raiding and conflict in the lowlands of eastern Tigray and Wallo from 1928 to 1930 
and which culminated in the Ras Gugsa rebellion may have been the result of conflict between new settlers 
and pastoralists. For an account of these events see McCann, Poverty to Famine, 146-168. 
39 
Information of Manz repopulation comes from personal communication from Allan and Susan 
Hoben on their fieldwork in Manz in the early 1970s. 
4o Bauer, "Land and Legitimacy," 218. 
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recent past and also resulted in restrictive land acquisition policies for 
newcomers and newly formed households. 41 
Land reform in most areas of the highlands has not affected the patterns 
of declining productivity. Social institutions for the distribution of capital 
resources have continued from the 1920s through to the present, though the 
relative scarcity of key resources such as seed and oxen has likely helped solidify 
local stratification by increasing indebtedness within the local agrarian economy. 
Cropping Systems 
From available accounts, highland farming systems have not transformed 
themselves beyond the technology or the basic cropping systems of the 
nineteenth century. 42 The wide variety of cultigens available across· the 
highlands has provided a substantial basis for local adaptation, sometimes to the 
needs of subsistence and other time in response to market opportunities. In 
lowland cultivated areas the traditional cereals barley, wheat, and teff had to give 
way to sorghum and maize which are less marketable but better adapted to short, 
unpredictable growing seasons. In the past decade, the move to more vulnerable 
land and the reduction in pasture for livestock has encouraged ·a· dramatic 
increase in the cultivation of oats over barley and a general decline in barley 
overall. 43 Local and regional shifts in crops like oats or the adoption of sweet 
potatoes have doubtless percolated through the rural economy as new crops have 
become available. Maize, a quick maturing crop with low labor requirements, 
was one example. For the most part new crops added to the existing mix 
represented minor adjustments to the needs of subsistence rather than major 
alterations in the basic farming system's allocation of labor or use of tools. 
Neither have agronomic systems across the highlands remained either 
uniform or static. For example, farmers of the vertisol plains in adjacent areas 
of Shawa and Wallo which have had historical marriage relations and share the 
language, social institutions and highland farming system differ in their 
management of their soil's tendency to waterlog. In northern Shawa farmers 
accept low productivity of their vertisol plots while their compatriots in the more 
densely settled Warra Ilu area of Wallo invest considerable labor in constructing 
broadbeds to drain excess water and achieve a significantly higher yield. Farms 
in bottom lands around Debre Berhan have traditionally planted belg season 
barley to overcome that land type's tendency toward frost and waterlogging 
41 The most critical variable is population density. While principles of land allocation derive from 
national policy, actual local practice is flexible in terms of policy toward new applicants and timing of land 
redivisions. 
42 For a survey of plow agriculture in the nineteenth century see Crummey, "Ethiopia Plow 
Agriculture." 
43 Though discouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture, oats have become popular because of their 
resistance to waterlogging and frost as well as providing substantially better fodder for livestock. The 
statistical evidence for this shift in production/consumption is only now emerging. My evidence comes from 
Samuel Jutzi of the International Livestock Centre for Africa and Ian Watt of the Department of 
Geography, Addis Ababa University 
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during the main rains. 44 In fact, the pressure to occupy these marginal plots 
suggests a decline in regional production per capita. 
In other areas the period from the beginning of the post-war era until the 
early 1970s the .introduction of active urban markets has transformed small farm 
market participation. The Ada district around Debre Zeit town had long served 
as a source for high quality cereals for the urban market and its mixed Oromo 
and Amhara farms had been designated madbet land to provision Menilek's court 
and even Addis Ababa's churches. Ada's proximity to the burgeoning Addis 
Ababa market, its rich soil, and stable climate promoted crop specialization in 
the post-war period at a level unprecedented in highland agriculture. Between 
1960 and 1980 percentage of crops in teff increased from 35 percent to over 50 
percent. 45 The specialization in teff was based on traditional technology and 
landholding and appears to have been the result of two processes: first, a 
response to growing urban markets for high quality teff, and second, a demand 
for rents paid in teff by urban landlords who through purchase or inheritance 
had acquired Ada land. In many cases teff never reached the market; land 
owning families stored it for household use and distribution in urban social 
networks. 46 Despite the intensity of market involvement, however, the basic 
organization of production remained rooted in smallholder farms using animal 
traction, scratch plows, and family labor. Fertilizer and improved seeds were 
available but only through limited credit schemes. 
Despite the evidence of adaptability in some cases, the overall trend on 
smallholder farms has been one of decline in resources per household and 
productivity per unit. Even the success story of Ada demonstrates the point well. 
The relatively high productivity of Ada agriculture in the post-war period 
attracted external aid agencies and private farming interests in the early 1970s to 
push the use of fertilizer and improved seeds.47 This interest and government 
credit schemes, in turn, drove land prices up and attracted new tenants and land 
speculators. Thus, the effect of Ada's success has been negative for per capita 
production: in 1969 average per household land holdings amounted to 3.5 hectares 
per holding while by the early 80s it had declined to between 2.0 and 2.5 hectares 
per holding with only a marginal increase in yield. At the same time the trend in 
subdivision and fragmentation had decreased both fallow periods and available 
44 See Oxfam America, Ethiopia Relief and Development (1988), 5. Also see Gryseels and Anderson, 
Research, 11-12. It is on such lands that oats are overtaking barley as a high elevation staple. 
45 See Gryseels and Anderson, Research, 12, which shows a consistent drop in wheat and other cereals 
from 1960 through 1980 and a slight rise in pulses. The latter is attributable to the practice of rotating pulses 
with teff. 
46 Assefa Mehretu, former head of the Institute of Development Research in Addis Ababa argues that 
elite landholding families in Addis Ababa rarely bought teff but brought it from tenant lands to Addis 
Ababa storehouses and distributed to family from there. Personal communication 
47 It is important to note that the process of specialization antedated formal development programs and 
extension in Ada. See Raymond Borton, Mammo Bahte, Almaz Wondimu, John Asfaw, "A Development 
Program for the Ada District based on a Socio-economic Survey." Stanford Research Institute, 1969: 62-68. 
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pasturage. 48 The major shift in cropping to teff reduced the production of other 
grains, though with slightly increases in pulses which rotated on teff plots. 
·The historical decline of land resources per capita through the twentieth-
century cycle might suggest a need to intensify cultivation across the highlands. 
Yet the record suggests that intensification of labor has not made major changes 
in productivity nor transformed farming systems. Rainfed highland agriculture 
has only a few points at which increased labor will raise yields-plowing and 
weeding--and demand for ox and human labor in these periods restricts its 
availability. moreover, traditional crops have limits on additional labor's capacity 
to increase yield. Teff yields increase with five rather than four plowings, but 
not with six; more weeding increases a harvest, but the effect is not unlimited. 
Uses of Non-farm Land: Forestry and Pasture 
The historical expansion of highland cultivation, though cyclical in terms 
of productivity, brought with it relatively permanent changes in the land. 
Pastoral landscapes painted in Tigray by Henry Salt in the early nineteenth 
century have changed beyond recognition. The political and military ability to 
expand over time also obviated the need for new technological or agronomic 
solutions to population density, tying the political system to farming systems and 
ecological change on the highland landscape. The historical ability of the system 
to expand has allowed problems of pressure on land, non-farm resources (fuel 
and forage), and capital to be resolved by out-migration and new cultivation 
before productivity decline and returns to labor have reached a crisis stage. 
In this historical pattern a key indicator of maturity in the demographic 
cycle has been the loss of non-agricultural land and its products--forest and 
pasture--which serve in early stages of development as free goods.49 The decline 
of forests and pasture as a resource in highland agriculture is perhaps the most 
visible indicator of population pressure and productivity decline. The loss of 
non-farm resources as a product of highland farming systems accounts not only 
for the local impetus to expand but also the weakness of local economies during 
historical periods when the military capability of the state was on the wane. 
Forests and pasture have been an important part of the ecological and social 
nexus of the highland rural economy. 
The historical data on the decline of forest resources is scattered but 
convincing. Forested area in Ethiopia as a whole has declined from about 40 
percent in the early twentieth century to about 4 percent today. 50 Most of that 
decline has taken place as a result of land clearing for cultivation and fuel as a 
direct consequence of the expanding highland agricultural activities. Charles 
Beke in 1843 noted the sharp contrast between settled eastern Gojjam and the 
relatively newly settled Damot area to the west; today natural forests are 
48 
Landholding figures come from Borton, et al, "Development Program," 96; and Gryseels and 
Anderson, Research, 11, 32. The trend is decidedly toward annual reductions in household land holdings. 
49 It is useful to note here that another indicator of the mature stage of the agrarian cycle in the 
establishment of trees and pasture (or fodder) as property. 
SO Gryseels and Anderson, Research, 10. Even more convincing is data which shows northern provinces 
account for only 4.1 percent of Ethiopia's forested area but contain 37.2 percent of its cultivated area. See 
Daniel Gamachu, Environment and Development in Ethiopia (Geneva, 1988), 7. 
18 
virtually absent in both sections of Gojjam where forested land has declined to .7 
percent of total area as cultivated land and population has increased. 51 Carlo 
Annaratone who travelled south from Koram in 1911 was more interested in 
politics than agriculture, but he did know the fuel needs of his entourage's 
nightly encampment. He reported abundant firewood in area along Wallo's 
eastern escarpment that in the past decade has been devoid of trees but full of 
cultivators. Today, forested areas account for only .3 percent of Tigray's land. 52 
The loss of non-cultivate 1d land resources has not been restricted to the 
northern highlands. In Wubera, Hararge old residents can name a range of 
primary tree species and point to valleys which were forests in their childhood 
but are cultivated today. The result of this change has meant a decline of wood 
fuel, a gradual shift to dung fuel and a consequent increase in women's labor to 
supply household fuel needs. By 1980 farm households in Ada and in Debre 
Berhan burned four times more dung by weight than wood.53 Local histories of 
women's work lives would effectively reveal the pace and significance of this 
change. 
The overall loss of forage/pasturage to cultivation has had a similar, if 
more direct effect on productivity since it directly affects supplies of capital, i.e. 
oxen. In areas in increasing population density pas,ture has steadily declined 
relative to livestock needs. 54 The changes in amounts of available pasture in the 
highlands is evident in Donald Crummey's observation that nineteenth-century 
travellers reported highland pastoralists in Tigray, Gojjam, Shawa, and the Lake 
Tana region, areas intensely cultivated today, By contrast, recent oxen per 
household figures form Simen, northern Shawa, Ada, Gojjam, and highland 
Hararge all show a fundamental shortage of traction animals. Though we have 
no conclusive statistical data for the pre-1960 period, recent evidence suggests 
strongly that the expansion of cultivable land correlates directly with a reduced 
capacity to support an adequate cattle/oxen population, 55 
The historical link between demographic density and reduction of 
oxen/livestock holdings is persuasive if not conclusive. The trend has been a 
gradual one associated with the loss of pasture far more than the short-term 
51 See Charles Beke, "Abyssinia - Being a Continuation of Routes in That Country," Journal of the 
Royal Geographic Society, 14 (1844), 3. For current statistics see Daniel Gamachu, Environment and 
Development, 1. 
52 Carlo Annaratone, In Abissinia (Rome, 1914), 121. See Daniel Gamachu, Environment and 
Development, 7. 
53 For a comprehensive study of agroforestry and farming systems see Peter Pochen-Eiche, "The 
Application of Farming Systems Research to Community Forestry: A Case Study of the Hararge Highlands, 
Eastern Ethiopia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs University, 1986). In ILCA research (Gryseels and 
Anderson, Research, 10) areas at Debre Berhan and Debre Zeit use of wood fuel now makes up 
approximately 1/4 of the total fuel source. The need to rebuild this resource is obvious. Yet, efforts to use 
local labor for afforestation schemes has added a further drain on household labor supplies with returns to 
the household being unclear. 
54 Gryseels and Anderson, Research, 10. 
55 My surveys in both northern Shawa and Wubera, Hararge show that the average ox/household 
holding has fallen below a pair per household. See James McCann, "The Social Impact of Drought in 
Ethiopia: Some Implications for Rehabilitation," in Glantz, Drought and Hunger, 252, which includes data 
from ILCA and Ministry of Agriculture surveys. 
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shocks from drought or disease. The Simen longitudinal study describes in detail 
the process of pasture loss and indicates that by 1975 the average household 
owned less than a pair of oxen. In Tegulet, Shawa where density has increased 
steadily during this century, farms in the last few generations have incorporated 
cows as traction animals because of the shortage of oxen. Even in the high 
production Ada region average oxen/household declined from 3.21 in 1969 to 186 
in 1980.56 Overall, the evidence on oxen holdings and the decline of pasture 
strongly suggests both a relative decline in the numbers of animals available per 
farming household and in most areas an absolute decline in the number of 
animals supported locally. 57 
Forests and pasture share their vulnerability to expanding cultivation but 
differ in their potential for regeneration. Open pasture can recover within weeks 
after a drought or in a season or two as fallowed cropland. Trees, once cleared, 
have a much longer cycle of recovery and most indigenous primary species have 
left the rural scene except in isolated, ritually significant locations. Fast-growing 
eucalyptus trees imported by Emperor Menilek from Australia in 1895 aided 
urban fuel needs, it has but have obviously failed to regenerate forests. In both 
cases, recovery can only take place with a decline of demographic pressure, 
though in the case of-forests, only as secondary growth. 
Feeding the State: Productivity and the Political Domain 
There are several ways that smallholder agricultural production and 
productivity can be affected by the political domain: 
1) the structure of taxes and tribute 
2) state/elite demands on agricultural labor 
3) effects of sporadic military activity 
The expansion of central state authority over local prerogatives in 
northern Ethiopia has been a dominant historical theme from 1889 through the 
post-war period. The evidence also suggests that this expansion has allowed state 
policies determined in Addis Ababa to penetrate to the farm level to a degree 
impossible prior to the 1920s. The most overriding and consistent feature of 
politics over peasant agriculture the course of the twentieth century has been the 
expansion of the state's willingness and ability to affect the nature of production 
extracted locally. The process began slowly since in the nineteenth century and 
through most of Menilek's reign the central government had severe restrictions 
on its ability to communicate with, extract revenue from, and coerce the local 
process of agriculture. 58 The ability to overawe or militarily suppress opposition 
was restricted to one or two areas at a time, having a symbolic as much as real 
effect. 
56 I have drawn these comparative statistics from two separate surveys. See Getachew Teele Medhin 
and Telahun Makonnan, "Socio-economic Characteristics of the Central Highlands of Ethiopia - Ada 
Wereda," unpublished report to the Ministry of Agriculture, 1974, 26 and Gryseels and Anderson, Research, 
14. 
57 See note 45 above. Also Messerli, Simen, 58; and McCann, Poverty to Famine, 80. 
58 The shift of the asrat from support of the church to support of local military was a notable 
exception, though its implementation was sporadic. See Joanna Mantel-Niecko, The Role of Land Tenure 
in the System of the Ethiopian Imperial Government in Modern Times (Warsaw, 1980), 208-209. 
20 
The process of state intervention in local political economies began in 
earnest in the early 1920s with policies of "fiscalism" initiated by Ras Tafari at 
the center but also by regional elites such as Ras Hailu in Gojjam, Ras Kassa in 
Wallo, Rases Siyum and Gugsa Araya in Tigray, and more localized elite.59 In 
the half-decade which followed his coronation as Haile Sellassie I, the emperor 
systematically reorganized customs collection, appointed loyalists to regional 
office, and began fiscal reforms to undercut prerogatives of local elite. 60 
Specific aspects of centralization and the expansion of state authority 
affected the local terms of agricultural production. Shifts in fiscal policy from 
proportional to fixed assessment and from in-kind to cash payments challenged 
the basis for subsistence strategies. 61 Officials from the state collecting the asrat 
(tithe) to fill local state granaries also required additional payment of fixed taxes 
and special collections in cash. The effect of the increased state presence locally 
appeared most dramatically in the state's ability to organize and centralize 
customs collections, a traditional prerogative of the local and regional elite. 
Revenue lost to rural elite could be recovered only by the more rigorous exercise 
of exactions on local agriculture. That many of Ethiopia's regional elites had 
begun to undertake urban residence and urban investment only increased their 
need for cash payments from their local constituencies. 62 
Evidence for understanding the effects of increased tax burdens, 
particularly those in cash, on agricultural production is scarce. From recent 
evidence, however, some effects are evident. The ultimate sanction held by the 
state over rural producers was the ability to confiscate land or withhold access to 
it for nonpayment of taxes. The ability to tax in traditional law bore with it an 
implied authority to alienate land, and this ability has continued after the 
agrarian reform program. 63 Farmers appear willing, now as in the past, to 
liquidate productive assets in order to maintain their access to land. 
My own observations of farm strategies under stress indicates that fixed 
tax demands during cns1s or recovery often results in capital disinvestment 
(selling of oxen or farm implements), the expansion of debt, and increased 
59 The crushing or subjugation of elite opposition in the north proceeded with Ras Gugsa in 1930, Ras 
Hailu in 1932, and Ras Siyum in 1932. The method differed in each case but the end result was the further 
extension of central government power. Control over key areas like Hararge and Shawa had taken place 
much earlier. 
6° For accounts of this period see Harold G. Marcus, "The Infrastructure of the !talc-Ethiopian Crisis: 
Haile Sellassie, the Solomonic Empire and the World Economy, 1916-1936," in Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Conference on Ethiopian Studies (Chicago, 1979), 559-568; and McCann, From Poverty to 
Famine, 127-172. Both accounts use Italian consular reports which provide an excellent, almost daily, 
account of central government actions in expanding its reach to the provincial and district level. 
61 For a description of the relative effects of fixed over proportional payments see James Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1976), 53. 
62 Ras Hailu is the most often cited example, but Ras Kassa, Wagshum Kabbada, and many others had 
established a firm financial presence in Addis Ababa and in regional capitals by 1930. Running such 
elaborate households required food and labor but also, increasingly, cash. For a good description of life at 
court see Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menilek ll; Ethiopia, 1844-1913 (Oxford, 1975), 218-
225. 
63 See Mantel-Niecko, Land Tenure, 110-111, here defined as crimes against the state. My own 
interviews with farmers faced with tax problems indicates a similar fear of loss of land. 
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dependence on off-farm income. In northern Shawa in 1985, for example, I 
interviewed drought-stricken farmers required to pay both a land tax, a drought 
tax, and special fees. Faced with the prospect of losing access to land, most 
farmers chose to decapitalize their farms (i.e. sell oxen, seed, or tools) to meet a 
tax burden. Though faced by a tax burden under a peasant association rather 
than a traditional melkenya, the peasant's decision to liquidate assets reflected a 
farm level economic decision similar, I believe, to one a farmer two generations 
ago probably chose. The increased administrative capacity of the state to enforce 
tax payments by involvement in the land allocation process has given tax 
payments a power beyond that in the past. Still, this process of change has been 
a gradual one for which the 1920s and 1930s were as much a watershed as the 
1970s. 
The process of capital disinvestment in the rural economy has been 
examined recently as an issue of famine response. Yet, the stress of famine 
conditions would appear to be only one type of crisis resulting in decapitalization 
of small farms. 64 Farmer's decisions to disinvest in agriculture and liquidate 
capital assets over the short or long term are indeed famine responses, but 
equally it can be a response to political circumstances. Political conditions have 
caused similar decisions which compromise the long-term welfare of the farm 
enterprise to short-term exigencies. Wallo farmers during the 1928-30 Ras Gugsa 
rebellion, for example, sold off stocks of grain at well below market price to 
avoid its appropriation by roving bands or rebels or government levies.65 The 
conditions for doing so have existed at several points over the course of the 
twentieth century because of the persistence of political instability. 
The resistance of local interests to this expansion of state power has 
resulted in a persistent pattern of local and regional rebellion and military 
campaigns aimed at suppressing them. Between 1898 and 1945 at least nine major 
campaigns lasting from several months to several years took place in the 
northeastern highlands. The resistance took the form of elite-led rural rebellions 
aimed at forestalling the loss of local income and political power. 66 Until the 
mid-1970s the central state won the day at every turn, allowing a consistent 
expansion of policies of taxation, customs control, and the presence of state 
officials. The centralization of state prerogatives since 1974 is an extension of a 
much broader trend, though recent success at suppressing local resistance has 
lessened considerably. 
64 
Peter Cutler has !poked carefully at the relationship between grain and livestock prices during 
drought and at the timing of oxen sales during crisis. Peter Culter, "Famine Forcasting; prices and peasant 
behavior in northern Ethiopia," Disasters (1984), 48-56 and personal communication. For non-famine causes 
of decapitalization see Dan Bauer, Household and Society in Ethiopia (East Lansing, 1977), 92-94. 
65 Corrado Zoli, Cronache Etiopiche (Rome, 1931), 329. 
66 The chronology of these events derives from monthly and sometimes daily reports from British, 
Sudanese, and Italian sources as well as local oral tradition and eyewitness accounts. For a narrative account 
see James McCann, "Households, Peasants, and Rural History in Lasta, Northern Ethiopia 1900-35" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1984), 145-197. For Wayane see Gebru Tareke, "Peasant Resistance in 
Ethiopia: The Case of Wayane," Journal of African History, 25 (1984), 77-92. 
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The intensity and effect of these frequent military campaigns and calls to 
arms on local production is a point of debate. 67 The epidemics and food 
shortages which often ended them may as likely been caused by the 
concentration of humanity as by natural environmental factors. Eastern Tigray 
and northern Wallo suffered more intensely and more frequently than other 
areas like Gondar or Gojjam, though the effects were sporadic. There is thus 
little new about farmers attempting to cultivate, harvest, and store their crops 
under the specter of ravenous troops, raiding parties or the conscription of their 
young men. 
Beyond consuming food supplies, traction animals and overwhelming 
sensitive balances of local health, the armies on all sides recruited and attracted 
young male labor away from the drudgery of farm work to the excitement of 
raiding and military achievement both for and against the central government. 
The loss of young men and even young women to local movements of resistance 
is therefore not a new phenomenon. Nor is the exodus of northern Ethiopians 
across the Sudan border to seek better economic opportunity and safer political 
conditions. Throughout the 1920s and 30s a steady flow of escaped slaves, 
politically disaffected officials, and labor migrants crossed into the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan in the 1920s and 1930s.68 Beginning in 1935 a large number of 
soldiers, officials, and hangers-on spent the Italian occupation in 
Khartoum/Omdurman and Sudanese border towns. Still others from Eritrea, 
Tigray, Bagemder, and Gojjam took seasonal wage labor in the developing 
Sudanese agricultural economy near the border. 69 Perhaps as many as 100,000 
young men from Eritrea and northern Ethiopia joined Italian forces in Libya as 
soldiers--a form of target labor--between 1911 and 1932.70 I would argue that such 
phenomena are the result far more than the cause of productivity decline. 
Conclusion 
In the twentieth century agriculture and the conditions of rural 
production in highland Ethiopia have been part of a historical conjuncture 
between the mature stage of a agrarian economic cycle and the growth of a 
modern political economy and its state. Far from being static, the various 
components of agricultural production--population, farming systems, technology--
67 I would argue, however, that pre-1960 campaigns put greater stress on local resources and production 
than their more contemporary analogues. The numbers of troops concentrated at any one point were 
considerably higher than anything in the past decade and poor transportation infrastructure meant that 
armies' dependence on local resources was much more substantial For the broader historical case see 
Richard Caulk, "Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935," _International Journal 
of African Historical Studies, 11,3 (1979), 457-493. Caulk never addresses fully the question of military 
action on overall productivity but points to the devastating effect on specific areas of military activity. 
68 Monthly records of border crossings were kept by Sudan district commisioners in Kassala, Blue Nile, 
and White Nile provincial records. See INTEL files and provincial records housed at the National Record 
Office, Khartoum. 
69 See McCann, Poverty to Famine, 185-193; The_Sudan Monthly Record contains monthly tallies of 
refugees from Ethiopia. See issues 1-83, 1929-37 held in the Sudan Library, University of Khartoum. 
70 See Campbell Telegram to Foreign Office, 8 November 1918, FO 371/79730 Public Records Office, 
London and McCann, Poverty to Famine, 189-191 
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have each had to adjust themselves to new conditions in markets, politics, and the 
constraints in resources like land, livestock, and labor. The process has neither 
been uniform nor "progressive": Simen's progress has been different than 
Gojjam's, Ada's different from Ankober's. Yet, overall the evidence suggests 
strongly that productivity, even where the rural economy has been most dynamic, 
has been in a fairly steady decline over the course of the twentieth century. 
This paper has outlined the evidence for productivity decline and, more 
broadly, the progression of an agrarian cycle which has reached a point of a 
crisis in productivity which has been several generations in coming. The effects 
of these cumulative processes have begun to show in the last two decades, but the 
roots exist in the beginnings of a major agrarian cycle which produced, overall, a 
balance of its resources and technical capacity in the post-war years but quickly 
matured and began its accelerating decline in the mid-1960s. 
The issue has not been the farming system's lack of resiliency as a system 
of social production-it has endured and expanded for more than a millennium-
but its failure to break the technological impasse as demands upon it have grown. 
The system which historically thrived through its ability to expand spatially has 
failed to adapt to political, climatological, and economic limits on further 
expansion and has not demonstrated a capacity to intensify through increasing 
returns to labor or to generate local capital. The growth of urban centers of 
consumption and political power has placed additional demands on production 
but failed fundamentally to transform the basis of agricultural productivity. The 
dramatic breakthrough in state power to effect agarian policy and to extract 
resources from rural areas begun in the 1920s and consumated with programs of 
resettlement and villagizaion in the 1980s has not resulted in a parallel 
breakthrough in technology of resource use. In many ways the 1974 revolution 
was a response to the state's failure in the 1960s and early 70s through its effects 
on the national economy. The short-term resolution has been that the urban 
centers of power have been able to derive their own food from surplus 
production areas (Gojjam, Arsi, Shawa) where climate has been favorable and the 
''Malthusian scissors" have yet to close. 
